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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality (“Korematsu Center”), Hispanic National
Bar Association (“HNBA”), National Asian Pacific
Americans Bar Association (“NAPABA”), National
Bar Association (“NBA”), National LGBT Bar
Association (“LGBT Bar”), and National Native
American Bar Association (“NNABA”), respectfully
submit this brief in support of the petitioner,
Michelle Lee.
The Korematsu Center is a nonprofit organization
based at Seattle University School of Law and works
to advance justice through research, advocacy, and
education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to
advancing the legacy of Fred Korematsu who defied
military orders during World War II that led to the
internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and
later became an advocate for the civil rights of other
victims of excessive government action.
The
Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring
that our courts, laws and government do not become
active participants in perpetuating discrimination.
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle
University.
HNBA comprises thousands of Latino lawyers,
law professors, law students, legal professionals,
1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than the amici
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission. Letters evidencing the parties’ blanket consent to the filing
of amicus briefs have been filed with the clerk.
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state and federal judges, legislators, and bar
affiliates across the country. The HNBA supports
Hispanic legal professionals and is committed to
advocacy on issues of importance to the 53 million
people of Hispanic heritage living in the United
States. The HNBA regularly petitions Congress and
the Executive on behalf of all members of the
communities it represents.
NAPABA is the national association of Asian
Pacific American attorneys, judges, law professors,
and law students. NAPABA represents the interests
of over 50,000 attorneys and approximately 75
national, state, and local bar associations.
Its
members include solo practitioners, large firm
lawyers, corporate counsel, legal service and nonprofit attorneys, and lawyers serving at all levels of
government. Since NAPABA’s inception in 1988, it
has promoted justice, equity, and opportunity for
Asian Pacific Americans as the national voice for
Asian Pacific Americans in the legal profession.
These efforts have included civil rights advocacy on
various fronts. In furtherance of its mission to
promote justice, equity, and opportunity for Asian
Pacific Americans, NAPABA seeks to ensure that the
government does not become a partner in advancing
harmful racial slurs.
NBA is the nation’s oldest and largest national
network
of
predominantly
African-American
attorneys and judges in the United States. The NBA
was founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000
African-American attorneys in the entire country
and when other national bar associations, such as
the American Bar Association, did not admit African-
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American attorneys. Throughout history, the NBA
consistently has advocated on behalf of African
Americans and other minority populations. The
NBA represents approximately 66,000 lawyers,
judges, law professors, and law students, and it has
over eighty affiliate chapters throughout the world.
LGBT Bar is a non-partisan, membership-based
professional association of lawyers, judges, legal
academics, law students, and affiliated lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender legal organizations. The
LGBT Bar promotes justice in and through the legal
profession for the LGBT community in all its
diversity.
This case stands to impact our
membership both professionally and personally. Our
members are of all different races, ethnicities, and
religious affiliations. We see this intersectionality of
our members every day, and fear a detrimental
impact should the respondent be successful in this
case.
NNABA is the oldest and largest association of
predominantly Native American attorneys in the
United States. Founded in 1973 when the first group
of Native American attorneys was entering the legal
profession, NNABA represents the interests of
approximately 2,700 Native American attorneys.
NNABA’s core mission since its inception has been to
promote the development of Native American
attorneys who share the communal responsibility of
advancing justice for Native Americans. NNABA
seeks to ensure that the government does not become
a partner in advancing harmful racial slurs.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici know all too well what it means to be
excluded from full participation in society. When this
exclusion is committed by a private individual or
entity, we can explain to our children that these are
actions by private actors and we can even see if there
is recourse to federal, state, and local laws that
might provide some relief. But when the government
itself participates in the exclusion by conferring
benefits to private actors, we are at a loss as to what
to tell our children. Private acts and expressions of
racism can be terrible and damaging, but they take
on a wholly different meaning and are particularly
corrosive to our ideal of an integrated society when
they occur with the sanction of government.
Simon Tam would have this Court believe that
this case is about political speech—that his reappropriation project is about “taking on/back” a
derogatory term that has been used to demean those
of Asian American descent. But that is not what this
case is about. This case is about a trademark. To
put a more fine point on it: this case is about the
registration of a trademark.
Trademarks, by their very nature, propose a
commercial transaction that identifies the source of
goods or services being offered. It is precisely
because of their commercial nature that Congress
has authority to regulate the trademark registration
system. In doing so, Congress seeks to both protect
consumers and to ensure the orderly flow of
commerce. But marks that disparage do not further
either of these goals. In fact, they do the opposite by
discouraging
consumers
from
full
market
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participation. As this Court well remembers, racial
discrimination has a depressing effect on the
economy. Thus, while the REDSKINS may be a
professed homage to the noble savage for some, it is a
painful reminder for Native Americans of their place
in American society. The Slants is no better. While
empowering to a young social justice rock band, that
same mark may be debilitating for those who
remember life in American internment camps during
World War II. At its core, Section 2(a) does not
operate as a ban on certain types of speech, but
rather a mechanism for dealing with the harmful
effects of racial, national origin, and religious
discrimination on interstate commerce.
There can be no doubt that even without
registration, Simon Tam can still use his mark and
his music to “take on” stereotypes about Asian
Americans. But what he cannot do is use the
government’s resources to prevent others from fully
participating in the American marketplace.
Reversing the decision below would prevent the
trademark registration program from transforming
what is clearly commercial speech into something
more. But it surely will not prevent Mr. Tam from
continuing his re-appropriation project.
ARGUMENT
A.

Congress and this Court have recognized
that racial discrimination threatens the
government’s substantial interest in
ensuring the orderly flow of commerce.
Not too long ago—in fact, within the lifetime of
our country’s President—businesses were allowed to

6
freely express racially discriminatory commercial
messages. Signs like “WHITE ONLY” affixed outside a
business’s entrance were not uncommon. In the
Southwest, before entering a business one might
read a sign that read “NO DOGS NEGROS MEXICANS.”
In other parts of the country, some businesses
discriminated against Native Americans (“NO BEER
SOLD TO INDIANS”), and others targeted Filipinos
(“POSITIVELY NO FILIPINOS ALLOWED”).

7

The deleterious effects of racism on commerce and
individual dignity have been undisputed for the past
half-century. Laws banning discrimination in public
accommodations, such as Title II of the Civil Rights

8
Act of 1964 2 and Washington state’s Law Against
Discrimination, 3 were enacted “to vindicate ‘the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments.’” 4 These laws were enacted to
ensure that state power to regulate commerce was
used to combat the effects of racial discrimination,
not profit from them.
Title II’s legislative history reveals that
Congress’s primary intent in enacting the law was to
address the deleterious effects of racism on
commerce and personal dignity. 5 As this Court
explained in upholding Title II, the congressional
record is “replete with testimony of the burdens
placed
on
interstate
commerce
by
racial
discrimination.” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 299 (1964).
The Court also cited “many
references” to racial discrimination causing “a
depressant effect on general business conditions in
the respective communities,” noting that this
discrimination “deterred professional, as well as
skilled, people from moving into areas where such
practices occurred and thereby caused industry to be
2

42 U.S.C. 2000a.

3

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.

4

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250
(1964) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2370); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010 (recognizing
that race and sexual orientation discrimination “threatens not only the
rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions
and foundation of a free democratic state”).
5

S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2370.
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reluctant to establish there.” Id. at 300. The Court
thus found “ample basis” to conclude that commerce
was adversely “obstructed” “because of [racial]
discrimination.” Id.
As Martin Luther King, Jr. explained in his Letter
from a Birmingham Jail, racism in commerce inflicts
a devastating toll on people of color, who have to
explain to their children why they are being treated
differently:
[Y]ou suddenly find your tongue twisted
and your speech stammering as you
seek to explain to your six-year old
daughter why she cannot go to the
public amusement park that has just
been advertised on television, and see
tears welling up in her eyes when she is
told that Funtown is closed to colored
children, and see the depressing clouds
of inferiority begin to form in her little
mental sky . . . . 6
The corrosive impacts of racial discrimination are not
limited to conduct in the public accommodations
context. Discriminatory speech in commerce can
have similar impacts. That is why, for example,
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits
advertisements that communicate a discriminatory
preference. See 42 U.S.C. 3604(c) (unlawful to
“make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or

6

Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 6-7 (Apr. 16,
1963), reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76 (1964).
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discrimination based on race, color, religion, [or]
sex”). And Title VII places similar restrictions on job
advertisements. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(b) (unlawful
“to print or publish . . . any notice or advertisement
relating
to
employment . . .
indicating
any
preference,
limitation,
specification,
or
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”).
Back in the 1960s, in a not-so-distant echo of the
arguments being raised in this case, defenders of
racial discrimination challenged state and federal
laws banning discrimination in commerce under the
First Amendment. But none of those challenges
succeeded, and by 1964 “the constitutionality of such
state statutes [stood] unquestioned.” 7
Dissenting in the opinion in this case below, Judge
Reyna poses the hypothetical of a restaurant named
“Spics Not Welcome.” If the restaurant nevertheless
served Latinos, it presumably would not be in
violation of Title II. Yet he notes that “[t]he mere
use of the demeaning mark in commerce
communicates a discriminatory intent as harmful as
the fruit produced by discriminatory conduct.” In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, No.
15-1293, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016).
Judge Reyna is right.
Unfortunately,
these
examples
are
not
anachronisms
or
implausible
hypotheticals.
Recently, gun shops in several states have placed
7

Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 259-60 & n.8 (listing states); see also In
re Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 245 (1967) (rejecting constitutional challenges
to Washington’s statute).
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signs on their stores that proclaim that the stores are
“Muslim Free Zone[s].”

The owner of one of the stores, Florida Gun
Supply, states, “My goal is to make sure they don’t
feel welcome here so I don’t have the need to
discriminate in the first place.” 8 In this way, the
owner is able, through commercial speech, to
accomplish that which he could not do through direct
denial of service. 9
The businesses that put up these signs accomplish
exactly what they set out to do: they erect, through
commercial speech, a discriminatory wall that shuts
8

Fight over Florida gun store’s ‘Muslim free zone’ is far from over,
(Dec. 5, 2015), http://wjhl.com/2015/12/05/fight-over-floridagun-stores-muslim-free-zone-is-far-from-over/.
WJHL.COM
9

In a similar fashion, an Indiana legislator conceded that Indiana’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act would permit businesses to put up
signs that say “No Gays Allowed.” Adalia Woodbury, Indiana Lawmaker
Admits “No Gays” Signs Will Be Allowed, POLITICUSUSA (Mar. 30,
2015),
http://www.politicususa.com/2015/03/30/connecticut-stateboycottindianas-rfra.html.
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off commerce to a class of individuals on the basis of
their race, national origin, or religion. In other
words, they accomplish through commercial speech
precisely what the Civil Rights Act was designed to
root out.
The elders in amici’s respective organizations are
all too familiar with confronting signs that marked
certain parts of the marketplace as being off limits to
them and their children. Amici have worked too
hard to fight for and win the right to fully participate
and enjoy the fruits of a desegregated marketplace.
But under the theory espoused by the decision
below, blatantly discriminatory signs could not be
denied federal registration under the Lanham Act.
In fact, if the decision below stands, “Spics Not
Welcome” could become a federally protected
trademark. And if that happens, the Latino father—
like the black father described in Dr. King’s letter—
would have to explain to his daughter, “tongue
twisted and [his] speech stammering,” why these
signs are not only allowed in modern-day America,
but also coated with the legitimacy of a federally
approved trademark.
B.

Section 2(a) advances the government’s
substantial interest in ensuring the
orderly flow of commerce.
“The intent of [the Lanham Act] is to regulate
commerce[.]” 15 U.S.C. 1127. Trademarks are “a
form of commercial speech and nothing more.”
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
Trademarks are used to “propos[e] a commercial
transaction” by identifying the source of goods or
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services. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
Because trademarks are commercial speech, the
government can deny or cancel registration if doing
so advances a substantial government interest, such
as the orderly flow of commerce. See id. at 564. By
that standard, Section 2(a) easily passes
constitutional muster because it is a content neutral
regulation that promotes the orderly flow of
commerce.
1.

Section 2(a) is a content neutral regulation
of commercial speech.
i. The government can regulate trademarks to
promote the orderly flow of commerce because “the
Constitution accords less protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded
forms of expression.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983). That is why the
government can ban deceptive trademarks.
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13. And it is precisely
because trademarks are commercial speech and the
government has a substantial interest in “insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly as well as freely,” Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976), that the government can
set up a federal trademark registry in the first place.
At its core, a trademark restricts other
commercial speech by ensuring that certain speakers

14
have a limited monopoly over the use of a particular
message. That is the essence of a trademark. 10
ii. But the same interest that gives rise to the
government’s power to register trademarks—the
orderly flow of commerce—also allows the
government to regulate trademarks. And that is
why Section 2(a) is content neutral. The “principal
inquiry” for determining whether a law is content
neutral is “whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In other words, in
determining whether a law is content neutral, “[t]he
government’s
purpose
is
the
controlling
consideration.” Id. (emphasis added).
See also
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)
(Ward test applies to commercial speech).
In Ward, the Court upheld restrictions on sound
amplification at an outdoor bandshell, because the
“[t]he principal justification for the soundamplification guideline is the city’s desire to control
noise levels at bandshell events, in order to retain
the character of the [adjacent] Sheep Meadow and its
more sedate activities.” 491 U.S. at 791. The Court
made clear that a regulation that “serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
10

The decision below erroneously conflates commercial and political
speech, reasoning that if a trademark has any relation to a political
message, it must be afforded full First Amendment protections. But that
simply creates a giant loophole to the rule that commercial speech is
treated differently, and would open the door to companies adopting quasipolitical messages to avoid the regulations (e.g., against deceptive
advertising) that would normally apply only to commercial speech.
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neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.” Id. at 791-92.
Ward built off the Court’s decision in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
The regulation at issue in Renton explicitly treated
“adult” movie theaters differently from other
theaters, and defined “adult” theaters solely by
reference to the content of their movies. Id. at 44.
Nevertheless, the Court treated the zoning
regulation as content neutral because the ordinance
was aimed at the secondary effects of adult theaters,
a justification unrelated to the content of the adult
movies themselves. Id. at 48. See also City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (concluding that
a regulation is “still properly evaluated as a contentneutral restriction” if the government’s “interest” is
in “combating the secondary effects . . . unrelated to
the suppression of the [message]”); Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, (1990) (regulating private speech
associated with child pornography given the
secondary effects of the speech). Taken together,
even if a regulation implicates content, that
regulation is still subject to intermediate scrutiny so
long as the government’s purpose is to address the
secondary effects of the speech.
Here,
the
government’s
purpose
under
Section 2(a) is not to suppress speech, but to ensure
the orderly flow of commerce. See 15 U.S.C. 1127
(“The intent of this chapter is to regulate
commerce[.]”). Racially discriminatory commercial
speech disrupts the orderly flow of commerce to a
substantial degree. The purpose of Section 2(a) is to
ward off those secondary effects, an interest which is
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unrelated to the suppression of any speech. That is
why Congress passed—and this Court has repeatedly
upheld—laws like the Civil Rights Act.
Thus, under Section 2(a), the government’s
concern is not whether it approves of the message
conveyed by a particular mark, but whether a
particular mark disrupts commerce by, for example,
inciting racial hatred or inflicting dignitary harm. In
effect, Section 2(a) is a rather quotidian time, place,
and manner restriction, similar to laws regulating
adult businesses, 11 or laws regulating speech because
of its secondary effect on commerce. 12
In addition to prohibiting registration of marks
which may disparage institutions or groups,
Section 2(a) also prohibits registration of marks that
are likely to cause confusion among consumers,
implicate their privacy interests, or are otherwise
misleading or deceptive—all things likely to harm
consumers or impact their ability and desire to
participate fully in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. 1052.
Just like marks that confuse or mislead
consumers, or marks that invade consumer privacy,
marks that disparage individual or group identities
have the effect of decreasing full consumer
participation in commerce while also sending the
message that the government is a participant in
endorsing, advancing, and promoting that behavior.
11

See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding ban on fully
nude dancing).
12

See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 647
(1994) (affirming F.C.C.’s must-carry regulations because they furthered
the substantial government interest in “protecting noncable households
from loss of regular television broadcasting service” (citation omitted)).
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Section 2(a) alleviates these harms and directly
advances the government’s interests in distancing
itself from racial discrimination thereby discouraging
the perpetuation of racial discrimination in
commerce and encouraging full participation by all
consumers in commerce. 13 A number of commercial
speech cases have recognized substantial interests
that are unavoidably entangled with government
disapproval of a certain message. 14 Here, Section
2(a)’s primary purpose of ensuring the orderly flow of
commerce also coincides with the government’s
substantial interest in discouraging racial, social,
and religious discord. 15

13

See Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695 (6th
Cir. 1981) (noting that “racial harmony and equality is a substantial state
interest”).
14

See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (discouraging gambling); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466-67 (1978) (regulating in-person
attorney solicitation).
15

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (recognizing
that “help[ing] to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups
that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right
of such group members to live in peace where they wish” is a compelling
state interest); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“In light of the sorry history of
discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes,
bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state
interest of the highest order.”); Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263,
277 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough a state government might practice racial
discrimination for decades—and many have—we would not therefore be
barred from considering racial equality a state interest of the highest
order.” (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396)); Sambo’s Rests., Inc., 663 F.2d at
695.
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Because the government’s interest is not to
suppress speech but to promote the orderly flow of
commerce, Section 2(a) is content neutral.
iii. The importance of this interest is perhaps best
evidenced by the policies implemented by the U.S.
Board of Geographic Names. 16 Dead Negro Draw,
Texas, ostensibly honors black soldiers who died
during a battle, except that until the U.S. Board of
Geographic Names intervened, it was called Dead
Nigger Creek on federal maps. 17 Over 30 place
names
in
America
were
originally
called
“Niggerhead” on federal maps, but most of those
names were changed to swap out “Nigger” for Negro,
such as Negro Ben Peak, Arizona—“named after a
miner known as ‘Nigger Ben McClendon.’” 18
As late as 1974, there were 200 place names on
federal maps that still referenced “Japs,” and even
today there are 30 places on federal maps named
“Chinaman.” 19 And until last year, a lake and creek
in Washington were called Coon Lake and Coon
Creek, respectively, on federal maps.
16

Donald J. Orth & Roger L. Payne, Principles, Policies, and
Procedures: Domestic Geographic Names, U.S. BD. OF GEOGRAPHIC
NAMES 21-22 (1997), http://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/pro_pol_pro.pdf.
As discussed above, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is another
strong example of the government disavowing harmful racial
discrimination in commerce.
17

Jennings Brown, Tal Reznik, & Matan Gilat, Racial Slurs Are Woven
Deep Into The American Landscape, VOCATIV (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.vocativ.com/news/244179/racial-slurs-are-woven-deep-intothe-american-landscape/.
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Id.

19

Id.
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It goes without saying that a black family would
be reticent to visit a place called Niggerhead. Just
like a Japanese mother is unlikely to take her son to
a park called Jap Point. And those feelings were
made all the worse because until relatively recently
the federal government approved those names and
published them on its maps.
This shows that when the government creates
programs like the federal trademark registry or
publishes maps, it may decline to allow others to use
the programs in a manner that contributes to
discrimination. Of course, individuals are free to call
these locations whatever they want—just like they
are free to use whatever trademark they want—but
the government is under no obligation to help spread
hatred, given the effects it has on commerce.
2.

Being denied federal registration has not
prevented Tam from continuing to use a
racial slur for his band’s name.
Amici are all too familiar with the sting of slurs
such as “slant,” “chink,” “gook,” “sand nigger,” and
the like.
These taunts are not limited to the
schoolyard.
Racial slurs and epithets often
accompany racialized violence. In 1982, a white
Detroit autoworker called Vincent Chin a “Chink”
and “Nip” before beating Chin to death with a
baseball bat. In 1992, Luyen Phan Nguyen was
killed in Coral Springs, Florida, by a group of white
men who followed Nguyen from a party after Nguyen
objected to the use of a racial slur. In 2001, Balbir
Singh Sodhi was killed in Mesa, Arizona, by a
gunman who had been overheard previously at a bar
saying he wanted to kill “ragheads.”

20
Simon Tam has used a racial slur as his band’s
name since 2006.
This usage has created a
protectable trademark and he could enforce his
common law rights in federal court. This usage
persisted even after his application for federal
registration was denied in 2013. The denial of
registration has not prevented him from continuing
his proclaimed project to re-appropriate or reclaim
this racial slur. 20
There is no extraneous
consequence to a mark owner who uses a trademark
that the federal government refuses to register.
Mr. Tam can still call his band The Slants, and still
register any other trademarks he wishes (so long as
those trademarks independently qualify). In fact,
Mr. Tam could still use the Lanham Act’s other
provisions to enforce his trademarks, registered or
not. 21
Put differently, engaging in speech that the
government refuses to register as a trademark does
not disqualify Mr. Tam from using the Lanham Act
to register and enforce other trademarks, or even to
enforce unregistered ones (like The Slants). 22 It is
20

Reclamation projects sometimes fail spectacularly. Commenting on
comedian Trevor Noah’s failed attempt to reclaim the slur “kaffir,”
Kagiso Lediga said, “It was well spirited, and it came from a good place,
trying to make it into a good word. But leave it alone.” Norimitsu Onishi,
Jail Time for Using South Africa’s Worst Racial Slur?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/africa/southafrica-hate-speech.html?_r=0.
21
22

See 15 U.S.C. 1125(a).

See, e.g., Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616
F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that cancellation of registration
“does not affect the mark’s validity, because a trademark need not be
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simply a narrow limitation on Mr. Tam’s ability to
force the government to publish this one mark in the
federal register.
3.

The cancellation of the REDSKINS
trademark registration illustrates the
importance of Section 2(a).
Race still matters in this country. For many, that
is not an easy concept to accept, given how far
removed we are from the Trail of Tears, slavery, and
Jim Crow. But the vestiges of racism are all around
us. This case is just one example.
There are others, too. One of the most visible
examples of a racist trademark is the one used by the
WASHINGTON REDSKINS football team. For decades
this team has called itself by a racial slur, and until
recently that slur had a federal seal of approval in
the form of a registered trademark. But recently, the
government decided to cancel the registration of
several of the team’s trademarks, finally recognizing
what so many already knew: that the term redskin is
a racial slur, and should never have been allowed
into the federal registry. The issue is currently
before the Fourth Circuit.
As applied to the
particular trademarks at issue in the two cases, the
question there is the same as the one presented here:
whether the government can, consistent with the
First Amendment, refuse to register a racially
disparaging trademark. Here, however, the court
below imposed the far more sweeping remedy of
registered to be enforceable”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he cancellation of a
trademark registration does not extinguish common law rights that
registration did not create.”).
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facial invalidation of a federal statute. Applying
such “strong medicine,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 613, the en banc Federal Circuit essentially
held that no trademark—no matter how offensive or
denigrating to racial groups, can be refused the
benefits that accompany federal registration.
The REDSKINS example informs how the Court
should approach this case. Even if the Court were to
decide that Section 2(a) is unconstitutional as
applied to Mr. Tam, it should not find Section 2(a)
unconstitutional on its face.
The REDSKINS
trademark is perhaps the foremost example of the
impact that a racially disparaging trademark has on
commerce. The mark is known worldwide, and its
use pervades every corner of our society. As the
REDSKINS case shows, this provision stands as an
important bulwark against a flood of racially
discriminatory marks that would severely and
negatively affect commerce, particularly for people of
color.
Amici use the REDSKINS example in this brief to
show the Court that the government can, consistent
with First Amendment principles, cancel or refuse to
register a racially disparaging trademark given the
substantial interest in an orderly flow of commerce.
The REDSKINS case exemplifies the magnitude of
impact that disparaging marks can have on
commerce, and it shows why we still need Section
2(a).
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i. For centuries Native Americans 23 have been
arguably the most marginalized group in the United
States. While the efforts of other racial groups to
overcome their respective marginalization are far
from over, in some ways the Native American
community is still just beginning. Among major
ethnic and racial groups in America, Native
Americans rank at or near the bottom in income per
capita, high school graduation rates, and political
representation, and suffer from the highest poverty
and unemployment rates. The child born in America
with the lowest probability of ever achieving selfdetermination is the Native American child. And
unfortunately that statement has been true for a
very long time.
It is against this historical backdrop of
marginalization that a $2.85 billion professional
sports team has proudly used a racial slur against
Native Americans as its team name. The word
“redskins” was around long before Pro-Football, Inc.
(“PFI” or the “Team”) adopted it as its name, logo,
and mascot. But it has always been clear that the
term has been used to dehumanize a group of human
beings living in America.
Like calling African Americans “niggers” and
Latinos “spics”—words that long ago fell out of favor
in common lexicon precisely because of their negative
effects on those groups—Native Americans have
suffered the indignity of being called “redskins” by
23

Amici use the term Native Americans throughout this brief to refer
interchangeably and collectively to American Indian, Alaska Native, and
Native Hawaiian peoples.
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those who would diminish their humanity. 24 The
main difference, however, is that Native Americans
continue to suffer this indignity in the common
lexicon. PFI would never call itself the “Washington
Spics,” and then have the audacity to argue that
doing so is okay because there is no proof that a
“substantial composite” of Latinos find that term
offensive. Nor would the National Football League
(“NFL”) permit such a name—it penalizes use of
racially derogatory language on the field as
unsportsmanlike conduct. 25
ii.
The term “‘redskin’ was first used as a
reference to American Indian people at a time when
[they] were hunted for bounty and a price was paid
for a red skin.” 26 It is “to Indian people what ‘nigger’
is to African Americans.” 27
24

Amici recognize the odious, abhorrent, and offensive nature of these
racist slurs, even when they appear in a legal brief that describes their
harm and repudiates them. Nevertheless, amici use the slurs themselves,
rather than their abbreviations, not to be incendiary or exploitative, but to
demonstrate a point: as a society, we are far more uncomfortable with
certain slurs, such as those that discriminate against African Americans
and Latinos, whereas the slur against Native Americans is almost
quotidian.
25

Roger Goodell, 2016 Official Playing Rules of the National Football
League, NFL 54-55 (2016), http://operations.nfl.com/ media/2224/2016nfl-rulebook.pdf; see also Jonathan Jones, Foul Language: The NFL is
cracking down on the use of the N-word on the football field, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/10/26/nfl-nword-penalty-unsportsmanlike-conduct (describing the NFL’s recent
history of imposing 15-yard penalties on players who use the n-word).
26

Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use of Indian
Team Names and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 HARV. L. REV.
904, 912 n.64 (1999) (quoting Letter from Lawrence R. Baca, Chairman,
Indian Law Section of the Federal Bar Association, to John Hope
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It is unlikely that when the Team adopted the
name “redskins” in 1932 that it was doing so as an
homage to Native Americans, and far more likely
that it reflected racial animus. In fact, the next year
the Team’s owner, “George Preston Marshall
instituted what would become a 13-year league-wide
ban on African-American players from the NFL.” 28
And, as the rest of the NFL integrated in response to
the Civil Rights Movement, the Team remained the
last holdout, clinging to segregation until the bitter
end.
It took 30 years—until 1962—for the Team to
integrate and finally accept its first non-white
players, the last NFL team to do so. But not because
the Team suddenly changed its mind about racial
discrimination: “[i]n contrast to other N.F.L. owners,
[Team owner] Marshall ‘did not pretend there were
no blacks good enough to make his team,’. . . ‘he was
honest enough to admit that he simply didn’t want
them around.’” 29
Franklin, Chairman, President’s Advisory Board on Race Relations 2
(June 30, 1997) (on file with Harvard Law School Library))
(HEREINAFTER “Indian Team Names”).
27

Id. at 912 n.65 (quoting Lawrence R. Baca, What About the Indian
Country “N” Word? 2 (Nov. 17, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Harvard Law School Library)).
28

Ending the Legacy of Racism in Sports & the Era of Harmful
“Indian” Sports Mascots, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS 2 (Oct. 2013),
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_
mijApMoUWDbjqFtjAYzQWlqLdrwZvsYfakBwTHpMATcOroYolpN_
NCAI_Harmful_Mascots_Report_Ending_the_Legacy_of_Racism_10_2
013.pdf.
29

Ryan Basen, Fifty Years Ago, Last Outpost of Segregation in N.F.L.
TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2012),
Fell,
N.Y.
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In fact, and particularly relevant here, the reason
the Team desegregated and began signing non-white
players was because “[t]he Redskins were preparing
to move into a new stadium being built on federally
controlled land affiliated with the national parks
system,” and the government stipulated that the
Team had to integrate to use the new stadium. 30 In
other words, for the sole purpose of taking advantage
of a discretionary federal benefit, did the Team
finally integrate. And even then, only begrudgingly
as the Team’s owner lamented that “the government
had the right to tell a showman how to cast the
play.” 31
Half a century later, the Team’s decision to cling
to its racist name is consistent with its
discriminatory past. But this time, the Team wants
to bootstrap its racist name to another discretionary
federal program: the trademark registry.
iii.
The government’s decision to decline to
register racist slurs makes sense for all the same
reasons
that
the
government
regulates
discrimination in public accommodations and
geographic place names—because the harms of
disparagement in commerce are real. “Indian team
names and mascots in particular have been charged
with fostering ‘racial stereotyping,’ causing low selfesteem amongst American Indians, and setting up

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sports/football/50-years-agoredskins-were-last-nfl-team-to-integrate.html.
30

Id.

31

Id.
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Indian children as targets for physical harassment
by their peers.” 32 And that’s not all:
The studies suggest that American
Indian
mascots
have
harmful
psychological consequences for the
group
that
is
caricaturized
by
mascots. This is true whether . . . the
mascot represented an American Indian
university, a mainstream university, or
a professional sports team.
....
American Indian mascots thus remind
American Indians of the limited ways in
which others see them. Moreover,
because identity construction is not
solely an individual process (i.e., you
cannot be a self by yourself), the views
of American Indians held by others can
also limit the ways in which American
Indians see themselves. 33
The bombardment of slurs has a lasting negative
effect on Native Americans, not only “threaten[ing]
the psychological functioning of American Indians”
but also “facilitating the expression of discriminatory
and explicitly racist attitudes toward American

32
33

Indian Team Names, supra n.26, at 911 (footnotes omitted).

Stephanie A. Fryberg, et al., Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian
Princesses: The Psychological Consequences of American Indian
Mascots, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 216 (2008).
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Indians” by non-Native people.
Steinfeldt explained to Congress:

34

As Professor

Having a cultural icon like Chris
Berman provide colorful commentary on
Washington’s pro football team doesn’t
mean that such a hateful racial
[epithet] (i.e., Redskin) doesn’t hurt
people—rather, it means that the people
using this hateful term have become
desensitized to the fact that they are
hurting people with their historical
tradition of dishonor. Despite how
members of mainstream society want to
frame the issue, this is NOT an issue of
mere sensitivity, offensiveness, or
“political correctness.” Rather this is an
issue
involving
oppression,
stereotyping,
and
inflicting
psychological harm[.] 35
Indeed, the human costs of racism that Dr. King
described are not limited to those contexts where an
accommodation is denied.
If a hotel clerk
begrudgingly accepts African-American and Native
American patrons, but calls each one a “nigger” and
34

Stolen Identities: The Impact of Racist Stereotypes on Indigenous
People: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indians Affairs 112th Cong. 69
(2011) (prepared statement of Jesse A. Steinfeldt, Assistant Professor,
Indiana University-Bloomington).
35

Id.; see also APA Resolution Recommending the Immediate
Retirement of American Indian Mascots, Symbols, Images, and
Personalities by Schools, Colleges, Universities, Athletic Teams, and
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N
(2005),
Organizations,
AM.
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/mascots.pdf (citing many studies finding
psychological harm of exposure to negative stereotypes).
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a “redskin,” those harms are not cut off at the front
desk; a father is still left with the unenviable task of
explaining to his daughter, “tongue twisted and [his]
speech stammering,” why a business is permitted to
register those terms and why they are still accepted
as normal parlance in 2016. 36 Likewise, if hotels
(and sports teams) admit minorities, but use names
like “Redskins Inn,” “Nigger Inn,” or “Spic Inn”—and
even get such names federally registered as
trademarks—the impact is similar to a denial of
public accommodations.
iv. Given this history, the government finally
canceled the registration of several of the Team’s
trademarks, correctly finding that they are racist
and contrary to the government’s interest in
promoting orderly and non-discriminatory commerce.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439,
461 (E.D. Va. 2015).
Canceling registration of the REDSKINS trademark
did not restrict PFI’s speech. The Team can still sell
hats, jerseys, and footballs bearing its racist name.
Cancellation simply means the government will not
affirmatively allow its own program to be used to
endorse, promote, or subsidize PFI’s ability to
capitalize on its mark. This Court has repeatedly
held that the government can decline to subsidize

36

See Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1990)
(noting that calling patron a “nigger” at a bar—despite serving him—still
satisfies the Title II requirement “of showing that he was denied equal
access to a place of public accommodation on the basis of race” because
“[t]he term ‘nigger’ is intimidating by its very nature”).
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certain speech. 37 That is especially true in the
commercial context where the government has a
substantial
interest
in
promoting
a
nondiscriminatory flow of commerce.
But the decision below creates a world where
“Spics Not Welcome” and “Muslim Free Zone” could
be registered as federal trademarks, and the
WASHINGTON REDSKINS could remain a federally
registered trademark. And so, should the decision
below stand, the Native American father must still
explain to his daughter why it remains acceptable for
others to think nothing of calling their people
“redskins” on SportsCenter, and why the federal
government has approved and endorsed the use of its
® next to a slur and done nothing to distance itself
from such racial discrimination.
We have come too far to take such a big step back.
CONCLUSION
Refusing federal registration of Simon Tam’s
disparaging mark may not eliminate the derogatory
term from the American lexicon. Indeed, it will not
deter Simon Tam from using the term for his re37

See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
546 (1983) (“We again reject the notion that First Amendment rights are
somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n,
555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009) (“[T]he State’s decision not to [provide
deductions for union dues] is not an abridgment of the unions’ speech;
they are still free to engage in such speech as they see fit. They simply
are barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor.”); Lyng v.
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
law barring certain workers who are on strike from receiving food
stamps).
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appropriation project. But these facts should not
prevent the government from refusing to use its
resources for activity that deters rather than
promotes commerce. Amici respectfully request that
the Court reverse the decision below.
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